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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MARCO A. GARCIA-GARCIA,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 45724
CASSIA COUNTY NO. CR 2017-2229
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Marco Garcia-Garcia pled guilty to two counts of aggravated battery. He received a
unified sentence of twelve years, with five years fixed, on each count. Mr. Garcia-Garcia
contends that his sentence represents an abuse of the district court’s discretion, as it is excessive
given any view of the facts.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contention that the term of the plea
agreement requiring Mr. Garcia-Garcia to waive his right to appeal the sentence was valid and
enforceable and should bar Mr. Garcia-Garcia from appealing his sentence in this case.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings were previously set forth in Mr. GarciaGarcia’s Appellant’s Brief and shall not be restated herein.

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Garcia-Garcia to twelve years,
with five years fixed, following his plea of guilty to two counts of aggravated battery?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Garcia-Garcia To A
Unified Sentence Of Twelve Years, With Five Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty To
Two Counts Of Aggravated Battery
The State contends that the term of the plea agreement requiring Mr. Garcia-Garcia to
waive his right to appeal the sentence is valid and asks this Court to dismiss Mr. Garcia-Garcia’s
sentencing appeal. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.3-5.) However, the provision of the plea agreement
in which Mr. Garcia-Garcia purportedly waived his right to appeal the sentences is
unenforceable, as it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the district
court, despite having a copy of both the plea agreement and the guilty plea advisory, failed to ask
Mr. Garcia-Garcia about the waiver of his right to appeal.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal as a term of a plea bargain, and such
agreements are generally valid and enforceable. I.C.R. 11(f)(1); State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456,
457 (1994). Because plea agreements are contractual in nature, courts typically evaluate them
utilizing contract law standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73 (2005). As with other types of
contracts, the interpretation of unambiguous terms and the legal effect of the plea agreement are
questions of law to be decided by the court. State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 369, 372 (Ct. App. 2014).
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained:
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A plea agreement is contractual in nature and must be measured by contract law
standards. The interpretation of a contract’s meaning and legal effect are
questions of law to be decided by the Court if the terms of the contract are clear
and unambiguous.
The meaning of an unambiguous contract must be determined from the plain
meaning of the contract’s own words. Where a contract is determined to be
ambiguous, interpretation of the contract is a question of fact that focuses on the
intent of the parties. Whether the facts establish a violation of the contract is a
question of law over which this Court exercises free review.
State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 418-19 (2012) (quoting State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886
(2000)) (internal citations omitted).
Where the State is seeking enforcement of a pleas agreement it drafted, it becomes the
State’s burden to prove that Mr. Garcia-Garcia knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered
into the plea agreement and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
appeal. State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 369, 372 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding the party against whom
waiver is asserted may contest the validity or scope of the waiver); State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho
456, 457 (1994) (employing the same analysis to determine validity of waiver of right to appeal
as the Court would in determining the validity of any guilty plea); State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,
497 (2006) (same).
In Cope, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Mr. Cope’s waiver of his right to appeal was
valid. Cope, 142 Idaho at 497-99. The Cope Court determined that the district court was not
required to discuss with Mr. Cope the plea agreement condition requiring him to waive his right
to appeal. Id. at 496-97. In so deciding, the Court considered the corresponding federal rule of
criminal procedure, F.R.C.R.P 11(b)(1)(N), which had been amended in 1999 to require the
federal courts to warn a defendant if they were waiving their right to appeal. Id. at 496.
However, the Cope Court concluded “that unless stated, there is no prerequisite requiring a court
to openly warn a defendant about his decision to waive his right to appeal.” Id.
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However, Cope was decided in 2006 and in 2007, Idaho Criminal Rule 11 was amended.
Where the Rule previously did not address a defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal, Rule 11
was amended to provide:
(d) Other Advisories upon acceptance of plea. The district judge shall, prior to
entry of a guilty plea or the making of factual admissions during a plea colloquy,
instruct on the following:
...
(3) If the defendant is waiving the right to appeal or other post-conviction
proceedings as part of a guilty plea, and such condition of the plea has been called
to the attention of the court, the court shall confirm with the defendant his
awareness of the waiver of appeal or other proceedings.
I.C.R. 11(d)(3). Ten years later, the language of the rule was amended again, removing the more
permissive “shall” and replacing it with the more strident “must.” The new language also
removed the burden on the defense to call the condition to the attention of the district court.

Idaho Criminal Rule 11 presently provides:
(d) Other Advisories on Acceptance of Plea. The district judge must, prior to
entry of a guilty plea or the making of factual admissions during a plea
discussion, inform the defendant of the following:
...
(3) If the defendant is waiving the right to appeal or other post-conviction
proceedings as part of a guilty plea, and the court is aware of this waiver, the
court must ask the defendant if defendant is aware of the waiver of appeal or other
proceedings.
I.C.R. 11(d)(3).
In this case, Mr. Garcia-Garcia signed paperwork which indicated he was waiving his
right to appeal the sentence; however, no waiver was put on the record at the time he entered his
Alford plea. (R., pp.86, 89; see generally, 10/13/17 Tr.) (Appellant’s Brief, p.3 n.4.) Although
Mr. Garcia-Garcia had a translator at the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing,
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there was nothing put on the record at either hearing notifying him that he had waived his right to
appeal pursuant to the plea agreement. (See generally, 12/12/17 Tr.; 10/13/17 Tr.)
The record clearly demonstrates that the district court had a copy of both the plea
agreement and the guilty plea advisory at the change of plea hearing. (R., pp.69-90; 10/13/17
Tr., p.3, Ls.15-18.) It went through some of the provisions of these documents with Mr. GarciaGarcia, ensuring that he “understood, agreed with, and had voluntarily signed both documents.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.5) (citing to 10/13/17 Tr., p.3, L.15 – p.11, L.1.) However, despite
having both documents in which the waiver was made, the district court did not “ask the
defendant if defendant is aware of the waiver of appeal.” See I.C.R. 11(d)(3). This Court should
find that the district court’s failure to comport with the requisite questioning resulted in an
invalid waiver of the right to appeal—one that was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.
Further, the State claims, for the first time in its Respondent’s Brief, that Mr. GarciaGarcia’s appeal should be dismissed because he waived his right to appeal his sentences pursuant
to the terms of the plea agreement. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.3-5.) The State even goes so far as
to argue that, because Mr. Garcia-Garcia has not challenged the district court’s determination
that his guilty pleas were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, he is precluded from
asserting on appeal that his waiver of his appellate rights were not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. (Respondent’s Brief, p.5.) However, the burden is on the state to show the waiver
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 369, 372 (Ct. App.
2014).
In Taylor, the Court of Appeals addressed Mr. Taylor’s contention that the State was
precluded from asserting for the first time on appeal that Mr. Taylor waived the right to file a
Rule 35 motion as a condition of the plea agreement. Id. 157 Idaho at 370-71. The Taylor Court
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held that the State is not required to file an early motion asserting a waiver “because a record of
the proceedings below is needed for determination of the scope and validity of the waiver.” Id.
at 372. The Court held that the State was not precluded from asserting for the first time in its
respondent’s brief that Mr. Taylor had waived his right to appeal. Id. Similarly, where the State
seeks to enforce the waiver provision, the State must establish the existence of the waiver, after
which the defendant may contest the validity or scope of the waiver. See Taylor, 156 Idaho at
372. Waiver of such a right “will be upheld if the entire record shows the wavier was made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Murphy, 125 Idaho at 456-57.
Where the district court did not ask Mr. Garcia-Garcia about the waiver at the change of
plea hearing, the State has failed to establish Mr. Garcia-Garcia knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived his right to appeal his sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Garcia-Garcia respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of October, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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